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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
';y ARREN IRRIGATION
COMP ANY, a corporation,

Appellant,

vs.

MILTON T. BROWN and
FLORENCE H. BROWN, his wife,
Respondents.

Case No.
12620

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Suit to quiet title to plaintiff's water rights and for
a decree declaring an exchange of water rights terminated or, if such relief is not granted, for a decree restricting the defendants' water right, herein referred to
as the "Lyman Skeen" right as to the water source, as to
the quantity of water reasonably required to irrigate the
defendants' land and requiring the defendants to pay
their pro rata share of the cost of construction, operation
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and maintenance of water diversion, storage and distribution facilities.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court decreed that the defendants are the
owners of the Lyman Skeen water right as described in
a decree, hereinafter referred to as the "1914 decree"
declared that such right could be used on certain land'
owned by the defendants, determined the annual amount
to be paid by the defendant for the water right, and
awarded damages against the plaintiff.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the
decree and the entry of a decree declaring that the Lyman Skeen water right was terminated by a condition
subsequent contained in the deed exchanged for the deed
which created the right and restoring to the parties the
rights originally owned by their predecessors or if such
relief is not granted, the entry of a decree declaring that
the Lyman Skeen right is limited to the land to which it
was originally made appurtenant, and to the quantity of
water that can be beneficially used thereon, that it is
limited as to the water source, and that its owners are
obligated to pay their pro rata share of the cost of con·
struction, operation and maintenance of irrigation fa·
cilities.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Warren Irrigation Company, will
be ref erred to in this brief as the "plaintiff" and the respondents, Milton T. and Florence H. Brown, will be
referred to as the "defendants."
The plaintiff is a nonprofit corporation engaged in
distributing water to its stockholders by means of the
Warren Canal and other facilities. The canal formerly
owned by the Utah Light & Power Company and Utah
Light & Railway Company, diverts water from the
Weber River near 12th Street, West of Ogden, and at
points below from Four Mile and Mill Creeks. The main
canal is 30 to 40 miles long, has a capacity of 90 second
feet (Tr. 14), and carries water for the irrigation of land
in and around Warren, Utah. The Skeen ditch with a
capacity of 8 or 9 second feet, diverts water under the
Lyman Skeen right from the Warren Canal and carries
it to the defendants' property shown on Exhibit C. (Tr.
15).
The facts which relate to the creation of the Lyman
Skeen water right are not in dispute. The right is the result of the exchange of deeds, one dated February II,
1903, (Exhibit H) from Utah Light & Power Company
to Lyman Skeen and the other dated February 16, 1904
(R. 47, 48) from Lyman Skeen and wife to Utah Light
& Railway Company (successor to Utah Light & Power
Company) . For the convenience of the Court, a copy of
each deed is appended hereto. (Appendix pp. 27-35).
They will be referred to as the "1903 deed" and the
"1904 deed."
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The defendants, as successors of Lyman Skeen
claim ownership of the Lyman Skeen water right, not a~
it is described and limited in the 1903 deed, but as it is
described in a decree in the case of Lyman Skeen v.
Warren Irrigation Company, dated, February 10, 1914,
and enforced by an order of the District Court of Weber
County, dated, February 5, 1938, in a case entitled, Lyman Skeen and D. A. Skeen, Plaintiff, v. Warren Irrigation Co., and Utah Light & Railway Company, Defendants, dated August 22, 1913, No. 4201 which relates to conveyance rights in a canal.
The parties construe the documents mentioned
above and their legal effect differently, the plaintiff contending that ( 1) the rights of the parties are determined
by the 1903 and 1904 deeds, ( 2) the plaintiff has by
denying water to the defendants, terminated the exchange of water rights as set out in the 1904 deed, (3)
the 1914 decree and the 1938 order are not pertinent to
the issue of termination, and ( 4) in the alternative, if the
court should hold that the exchange is not terminated,
by the condition subsequent in the 1904 deed, then the
1914 decree should be construed as merely substituting
one provision, a method of delivery of water and not
superseding the 1903 deed as contended by the defendants. The defendants on the other hand contend that the
1914 decree entirely superseded the 1903 and 1904 deeds
that the plaintiffs predecessor and the plaintiff have already had their day in court, that the 1914 decree and
the 1938 order are res judicata and there are no issues
of fact or law before the court.

4

To avoid repetition, the language of the documents
mentioned above will not be quoted and discussed in the
statement of facts, but only in the argument.
The plaintiff has pleaded facts which raise equitable
issues which must he considered only if the court holds
that the happening of the condition subsequent did not
terminate and restore to the parties the water rights as
they existed prior to 1903. Evidence was offered and
received in support thereof.
The full flow of water under the Lyman Skeen
right, as fixed by the 1903 deed and the 1914 decree,
greatly exceeds the quantity of water which can he beneficially used on the defendant's land. A civil engineer,
Lew A. W angsgaard, testified that the quantity of water
provided by the flow of water set out in the 1914 decree
would annually total 252 acre feet and that the land
owned by the defendants originally described in the 1903
deed, comprised only 50.26 acres and reasonably required only 150 acre feet of water for irrigation. (Tr.
8-10). No other expert testimony was introduced on this
issue. It was countered by the testimony of the defendant Milton T. Brown, that he needed all the water provided by the Lyman Skeen right. (Tr. 63).
In 1922, Lyman Skeen deeded to his sons, Blaine
and Wilford a total of 80 acres which included some
'
67.5 acres of the land described in the 1903 deed to which
the Lyman Skeen water right was appurtenant. (See the
map, Exhibit C and the deeds, Exhibit K.) The deed
contained no reservation of the water right. The defend-

5

ants own only 50.26 irrigable acres which were described
in the 1903 deed. (See Exhibit C and Tr. 16-18.)
The 1903 deed by its terms provides in paragraph
{2) that the water to be furnished Lyman Skeen was to
be " ... from the now e.risting rights of the Utah Light
& Power Company in the waters of \Veber River, .Mill
Creek and Four .l\lile." The 1914 decree limits the source
of water ... "to natural sources of supply (exclusive of
its pumping plant) ... "
Testimony was given by J ..Maurice Skeen that the
sources of water in the \Varren Canal are the Weber
River, Four Mile Creek and Mill Creek and that in 1945
and 1954, pumps were installed at a cost of $9,200.00,
and in 1962, a dam was constructed in \V eber River at a
cost of $56,527.00. In 1967, a diversion dam was constructed at a cost of $16,800.00. Some of the costs were
repaid by the ASCS. About 1932, the plaintiff purchased 1,500 acre feet of storage water in Echo Reservoir. (Tr. 27). \\Tater from all sources has gone to .Mr.
Brown. (Tr. 27, 28). Following this testimony, an objection was made to the question as to whether there was
any difference in the delivery of water as to the source
of water. (Tr. 28). We quote from the record:
MR. SKEEN: \Ve take the position under these
documents ~Ir. Brown was entitled only to the
water or water from the water source available
on the date of the original indenture in 1903 and
that he has no interest in the water that the com·
panies purchased since or acquired by purchase,
or otherwise.
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MR;. CLYDE: There is no issue on that. We
don t deny that. I mean we are entitled to the four
and five feet exactly as that deed says, and purchases they have mad_e fro:r;n Echo or improvements they haye made m their pumping system to
get other or d1fferent waters we have no interest .
.MR. SKEEN: If you admit you have no interest, I will withdraw the question.
MR. CLYDE: All right. (Tr. 28)
It is alleged in paragraph 5 of the complaint that,
"The defendants further claim the right to the benefit,
without cost to them of all water diversion, storage and
distribution facilities constructed at great expense to the
plaintiff and its stockholders since February 11, 1903."
(R. 2) The defendant.s claim that the payment of the
sum of 30 cents per acre for 110 acres or $33.00 meets
all of the obligations of the defendants to pay for the
water and the cost of operation and maintenance of the
diversion and distribution system of the Warren Irrigation Company. The evidence is uncontradicted that the
stock of plaintiff corpora tion has been assessed annually
from 1929 to 1970 in amounts varying from $2.00 to
$7.00 per share to pay for the maintenance of the canal,
the diversion dam, pumping expense, water master and
the "total expense." (Tr. 33). The Lyman Skeen right
is shown on the books of the irrigation company, sometimes as no shares and sometimes as no acres, but it has
always been assessed $33.00 a year. (Tr. 32).

The trial court found that the 1914 decree superseded the 1903 deed and contained no limitations as to
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the place of use (R. 83, 84); that the water has been delivered to Lyman Skeen and his successors from 1914 to
1968 and that the defendants now own 80 acres formerly
owned by Lyman Skeen and that for at least 50 years, the
Skeen Ditch water has been used on the 80 acres ( R.
84). The court further found that the deeds from Lyman
Skeen to Blaine and Wilford Skeen of 80 acres, did not
carry any water and that all of the Lyman Skeen right
was retained by Lyman Skeen and passed by mesne conveyance.s to the defendant. ( R. 84, 85) .
Finding of fact No. 6 provides in part as follows:
6. That the 1914 decree refers specifically to the
deed from Utah Light & Power Company, dated
in 1903, but does not make any reference to a
1904 deed on which plaintiff relies. That any
claims or limitations provided for by the deeds
could have been raised by plaintiff in the 1914
litigation. That the rights of the parties in regard
to this water were settled by the 1914 decree, and
the parties have abided by that decree at all times
until about 1937.

In paragraph 7 of the findings, the court found that
in 1968, the plaintiff company wrongfully elected to
withhold half the Lyman Skeen water from the defendants, and the defendants had to lease 24 shares at a cost
of $7.75 a share in 1969 and $8.50 in 1970. (R. 87).
The court found that the restriction on the place of
use of the Lyman Skeen water was " ... not carried forward into the decree ... ";that the water had been used
on land outside the 147 acre tract described in the Hl03
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deed since 1922 and that the entire 252 acre feet of water
produced by the Lyman Skeen right can be beneficially
used on the defendants' 80 acres of land (R. 87). The
$33.00 a year assessment as provided in the 1903 deed
and carried forward to the 1914 decree was a payment in
full for the water supplied. ( R. 87).
The court below decreed that the defendants are the
owners of the Lyman Skeen right as decreed in 1914
and that the plaintiff is hereby
" ... ORDERED to deliver the water to said defendants, measured over a weir constructed at or
near the headgate of that certain lateral upon the
north branch of defendants' canal system known
as the Skeen Ditch, in strict accordance with the
terms of said decree, and the plaintiff is hereby
enjoined from claiming any right, title, estate or
interest in said water or any part or portion
thereof."
It is further ordered that the Skeen right may be
used on the 80 acres of land now owned by the defendants " ... and that the annual assessment for said water
right to be paid by the defendant, is $33.00 per year.
Judgment for $390.00 for the rental water was awarded
to the defendants.

STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

I. The court should have enforced the termination

provision in the 1904 deed.
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2. The court eered in finding that the 1914 decree
entirely superseded the 1903 deed and in failing to enforce the covenants in that deed.
3. The court erred in failing to include in the decree
the restrictions imposed by the 1914 decree, by the 1903

deed, by the stipulations of defendant as to the source of
water for the Lyman Skeen right, and by the law.

ARGUMENT
1. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ENFORCED

THE TERMINATION PROVISION IN THE
1904 DEED.

The 1903 deed from Utah Light & Power Company, party of the first part, to Lyman Skeen, Exhibit
H - Appendix p. 27, conveyed to him a water right
subject to conditions spelled out in detail. These are summarized as follows:
I. Subject to all prior rights on the basis of one
second foot flowing continuously for each 150
acres of land the right to have delivered to Lyman
Skeen water for use on 110 acres out of 147.37
acres specifically described "and not otherwise."
2. The water to be furnished from the "now existing rights of the Utah Light & Power Company
in the waters of the 'Veber River, Mill Creek, and
Four Mile; provided that when the water commences to fail or is low or insufficient in said
canal for any cause, or in the sources from which
the water is obtained by the party of the first part
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(Power Company) the grantee shall have his
proportion and pro-rata of the water with others
now and hereafter, on the same system."
3. The second party shall pay to the power company 30c "for each acre of water to which he is
entitled ... ," There follows a significant statement to the effect that, "And in default of the
payment of said sums of money by the party of
the second part, or its successors and assigns, for
water used by the party of the second part, or his
heirs and assigns, on said land or any part of them
or otherwise said claim for payment of water shall
at all times constitute a first lien of the party of
the first part on all of said water and water rights
hereby conveyed ... " Emphasis and parenthetical statement added.
The 1904 deed from Lyman Skeen and wife, "parties of the first part" to the Utah Light & Railway Company, "party of the second part" recites that the parties
of the first part are the owners of a water right amounting to 307.20-1046.95 of the whole of Salt Creek or
Four .Mile and are the owners " ... of other interests in
water rights including canals and water ditches, and
"\Yhereas the party of the second part is about
to make an e.i:clumge of said water rights from
the said Lyman Skeen and his wife Anna Skeen,
and in u·change therefor to transfer to them certain water rights in the Utah Light & Railway
Company's canals and reservoirs, hereinafter ref erred to." (Emphasis added.)
The next paragraph provides that in consideration
of one rlolJar " ... and also in consideration of a certain
deed for water and water rights given by the Utah Light
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& Power Company, predecessor of the Utah Light &
Railway Company in favor of said Lyman Skeen, which
said deed is dated the 11th day of February, 1903 ... "
the first parties grant, bargain, sell and transfer to the
second party the water rights in Salt Creek and Four
Mile Creek mentioned in the recitations quoted above.
The next provision of the deed contains a condition
subsequent as follows:
"Provided always, and the above grant, by the
party of the first part is made for the express consideration that in case the Utah Light & Railway
Company, or its grantor, the Pioneer Electric
Power Company, or any of its or their assigns, or
successors in interest, shall wilfully refuse to
carry out the agreement to deliver water which is
contained in the deed, to the party of the first
part hereto, which deed is dated in the caption
11th of February, 1903, then the grant of the
water right in their deed shall cease and determine, and the parties hereto of the first part shall
be restored to all the right they had prior to the
giving of this deed, and no length of time shall
vary their part of this agreement.

It is an elementary rule of construction that when

two deeds are between the same parties related to the
same subject matter or are parts of the same transaction,
they will be construed together.
26 C.J .S., Sec. 91 Deeds, pp. 840-842

The rule is especially applicable where as in this
case the 1904 deed specifically refers to the 1903 deed
by date!
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The two deeds when construed together clearly constitute an agreement for exchange of water rights. Lyman Skeen got the water right described in the 1903 deed
and the Utah Light & Railway Company got the water
right described in the 1904 deed. The exchange agreement contained the condition subsequent quoted above
to the effect that upon the wilful refusal to carry out the
agreement to deliver water under the 1903 deed " ...
the grant of the water right in their deed shal,l ce0.8e and
determine, and the parties hereto of the first part shall
be restored to all the right they had prior to the giving of
this deed ... " (Emphasis added.)
The defendants have pleaded and proved that the
plaintiff ref used to deliver water to them in 1969 and
1970. Under the plain language of the 1904 indenture
the "grant of the water right ceased and determined." It
is clear that the effect of this provision is automatic.
There is no requirement of notice and by the plain terms
of the instrument the defendants' right has ceased and
their right is restored to 307.20/1046.95 of the water of
Salt Creek. No contention can successfully be made that
there was !aches because the indenture provides: ". . .
and no length of time shall vary their part of this agreement."
The agreement between the parties was made by the
exchange of the indentures. The language of the deeds
is clear and unambiguous, and the provision for termination of the exchange must be enforced. This disposes of
the case.
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The following argument on the other points shall
not constitute a waiver of Point No. 1.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE 1914 DECREE ENTIRELY SUPERSED.
ED THE 1903 DEED AND IN FAILIXG TO EN.

FORCE THE COVENANTS IN THAT DEED.

The trial court found (Findings Nos. 2, 6, 9 and 10;
R. 83, 84, 85, 87, 88) in substance and effect that the
1914 decree superseded the 1903 and 1904 deeds an<l
decreed that the defendants " ... are now the owners of
100 per cent of the water right decreed to Lyman Skeen
... "by the 1914 decree and ordered delivery of water in
strict accordance with the terms of the decree. The findings and decree are the result of an erroneous construction of the decree.
The 1914 decree recites ". . . and the said parties
having adjusted the differences between them in this
action, and by stipulation made in open court, adjusted
a settlement thereof, in which it was agreed that the
terms of said settlement shall be entered as the decree in
this action, ..."
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUD~~D
AND DECREED that in lieu of the prov1s1on
contained in that certain deed dated February
nth, 1903, from the Utah Light & Power ~~m
pany to Lyman Skeen, the pl~intiff, prov1dm~
for the delivery to him of certam waters for 1rr1gation purposes, that the. said def e~dant as successor in interest of the said Utah Light & Power
Company, beginning with the irrigation season
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for the year 1915, and during each and every year
thereafter, deliver to the plaintiff, his heirs administrators and assigns, five second feet of ~ater
measured over a weir, to be constructed at or near
the headgate of that certain lateral upon the north
branch of defendant's canal system, known as
the "Skeen Ditch," every fourteen days for a
period of forty-eight hours, during the months of
April, May and June, and for second feet every
fourteen days for a period of forty-eight hours
during the months of July, August and September, and the said plaintiff, his heirs, administrators
and assigns, are hereby adjudged and decreed to
have the right to the use of said five second feet
of water for a period of forty-eight hours every
fourteen days during the months of April, May
and June, and four second feet of water for a
period of forty-eight hours every fourteen days
during the months of July, August and September, during the year 1915 and each and every
year thereafter.
The next paragraph in the decree relates to failure
to deliver water by reason of unavoidable accident to the
canal, the following paragraph relates to the payment of
$33.00 for the water supplied and furnished and the
final paragraph relates to the rights of the parties in the
event of foreclosure of the rights of Lyman Skeen.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the
exchange of water rights is still in effect, the vital question arises as to whether the language of the decree,
"... that in lieu of the provision contained in that certain
deed dated February 11, 1903 ... "means that the decree
was intended to entirely supersede the deed or whether
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the decree was intended to supersede only that provision
of the deed which is modified by the decree, to-wit, the
provision relating to the method of delivery of water.
The language of the decree indicates an intent to
substitute only the water delivery provision in the decree
for the water delivery provision in the deed. It will be
noted that the decree uses the singular of the word "provision" as it relates to the deed. It says, "It is hereby
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that in lieu of the provision contained in that certain deed ... ". The deed contains three pages of provisions but the modification by
the decree points only at the " ... provision-providing
for the delivery to him of certain waters ... ".
We think the decree clearly states that the "in lieu
language" refers only to the provisions relating to delivery of water and that except for the modification to give
the grantee a large useable stream of 4 or 5 second feet
for irrigation every 14 days instead of a constant flow of
110/150 of a second foot the parties intended to leave the
1903 deed in force as written. There is not a word in the
decree indicating an intent to supersede all provisions of
the deed. If such was the intent the word provision would
have been in the plural, and many other important provisions would have been added to the decree.
Considering the obvious importance to the grantor
of such conditions as the place of use (which determines
the point of delivery) the furnishing of water from "now
existing rights," the penalty of $2.00 per acre for each
additional acre or part of an acre of water used by the

16

grantee, the priority of the rights of the parties in time
of drowth, and the imposition of a lien on and the right
to sell the water right to enforce payment of the annual
assessment, it seems clear that the parties did not intend
the decree to be a substitute for the deed.
If we assume for the sake of argument only that the
decree is ambiguous, the court may properly consider
not only all provisions of the judgment but the entire
record.

The law is well stated in Corpus Juris Secundum as
follow~:

As a general rule, the meaning, effect and legal
consequences of a judgment must be ascertained
from its own provisions and language, if possible.
If, however, the judgment is ambiguous or obscure, or a satisfactory interpretation cannot be
determined from the judgment itself, the entire
judgment roll or record may be looked to, examined, and considered for the purpose of interpreting the judgment and determining its operation and effect.
49 C. J. S., Sec. 436, pp. 867, 868
The court may look to the pleadings to determine
the meaning of an ambiguous judgment.

Lipsitz v. First National Bank, 293 S.W. 563
(Texas)
MUler v. Madigan, 90 Oki. 17, 215 P 742
The pleadings disclose that the only issue in Case
No. 4677 (Exhibit L) was as to the delivery of water.
See the amended complaint filed July 14, 1914 in the
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folder marked 4677 and the answer filed October 31,
1914. The file indicates that during the trial judgment
was entered " ... as per stipulation filed in open court."
The written stipulation was filed November 10, 1914, a
copy of which is appended. Appendix p. 33. It states:
That is lieu of the delivery by the defendant to
the plaintiff of water from its canal system as
provided in that certain deed from the plaintiff
Lyman Skeen and wife to the Utah Light and
Railway Company, dated February 16th, 1904,
and that certain deed from the Utah Light and
Power Company to Lyman Skeen dated February 11th, 1903, by turns and period,.y as in said
last mentioned deed contained, that beginning
with the irrigation season for the year 1915 and
for each and every year thereafter that the said
defendant will deliver to the plaintiff, his heirs
and assigns, measured at the headgate of that
certain lateral upon the north branch of defendant's canal system known as the Skeen Ditch,
every fourteen days, beginning with the irrigation season of each year, five second feet of water
to be used upon each delivery for a period of forty
eight hours during the months of April, May, and
June, and four second feet of water to be used
for a period of forty eight hours delivered every
fourteen days as aforesaid in the months of July,
August, and September.

The stipulation ties the two deeds together and
makes it abundantly clear that it relates only to the water
delivery provision in the 1903 deed and does not supersede either or both deeds.
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3. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IN-

CLUDE IX THE DECREE THE RESTRICTIONS 11\IPOSED BY THE 1914 DECREE, HY
THE 1903 DEED, BY THE STIPULATION OF
DEFENDANT AS TO THE \VATER SOURCE
FOR THE LYMAN SKEEN RIGHT AND BY
LAW.
The trial court entered a decree which either does
not settle at all or erroneously decides the issues between
the parties as framed by the pleadings. The complaint
and answer raise the following issues :
A. \Vhether the defendants are obligated to pay
their share of expenses of operation and maintenance of
the plaintiff's canal system.
B. Whether the defendants can irrigate land other
than that described in the 1903 decree.

C. \Vhether the defendants' water right has a priority superior to plaintiff's water right.
D. Whether all water awarded by the 1903 deed as
modified by the 1914 decree can be beneficially used on
defendants' 50 acres of land.
E. \Vhether the defendants can have the benefit
without cost to them of diversion, storage and distribution facilities constructed by the plaintiff since February
II, 1903.

These issues will be discussed in the order stated.
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A. With respect to issue A above, the court found
that it was the obligation of the defendants to pay" ...
$33.00 per year" in full for the water supplied. (Finding No. 8; R. 8 7) . The decree provides " ... and the annual assessment for said water right to be paid by the
defendants to plaintiff is $33.00 per year." (R. 90). It
will be noted that nowhere in the 1903 deed, the 1914
decree or the decree from which this appeal is taken does
there appear a provision that the defendants are not required to pay their reasonable share of the expense of
operation and maintenance. The $33.00 per year is for
the "water" (see finding of fact No. 8) ( R. 86) and "for
said water right" (see the next to last paragraph of the
decree) (R. 90). The 1903 deed states that the thirty
cents per acre is" ... for each acre of water." This document is entirely silent as to the expense of operation and
maintenance.
Section 73-1-9 provides:
"73-1-9. Contribution between joint owners of

ditch or reservoir. - \Vhen two or more f.ersons
are associated in the use of any dam, cana , reservoir ditch, lateral, flume or other means for conserv'ing or conveying water for the irrigation of
land or for other purposes, each of them shall be
liable to the other for the reasonable expenses of
maintaining, operating and controlling the sam.e,
in proportion to the share .in th~ use ~r ownership
of the water to which he is entitled.

The rule announced by the Supreme Court of Utah

in Gunnison-Fayette Canal, Company v. Roberts, 12
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Utah 2d 153, 364 P2d 103 regarding obligations of joint
users of a canal is as follows:
"In th~ 3:bsence of an enforceable agreement between J?mt. users of a canal specifying the rights
and obhgabons of the parties with respect to the
~ayment of the canal's expenses, the statute (secbon 73-1-9, U.C.A. 1953) is controlling." 364
P2d 105
There being no agreement as to operation and maintenance expenses the rule in the GunnisonFayette Canal
Co., supra, is applicable and the defendants are obligated
to pay a fair proportion of such expenses pursuant to
Section 73-1-9 U.C.A. 1953.
B. The Court erred in failing to limit the use of the
Lyman Skeen water right to the 147 acres of land described in the 1903 deed. The court found (Finding No.
9; R. 87) that this restriction was not carried into the
decree. The plaintiff contends, and has argued above,
that the decree wa~ in lieu of only one provision in the
1903 deed-that relating to the delivery of water. That
argument, if sound, disposes of this point. However,
there is another reason why the finding and decree are
erroneous as to this issue. Once a water right becomes
appurtenant to land, it cannot be changed to other land
without filing an application with the State Engineer.
The law in effect in 1922 when Lyman Skeen conveyed land to his sons, Blaine and Wilford and used it on
other land, is found in Section 8, Chapter 67, Laws of
Utah, 1919 which provides:
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Any person, corporation or association, entitled
to the use of water, may change the place of diversion or place of use and may use the water for
other purposes than those for which it was originally appropriated, but no such change shall lie
made, if it impairs any vested right, without just
compensation; no change of point of diversion,
place or purpose of use shall be made except on
the approval of an application of the owner by the
State Engineer.
The record does not disclose any application for
change of place of use of the Lyman Skeen right from
the land described in the 1903 deed.
The record also shows that the conveyances to
Blaine and Wilford reserved no water right and as a
matter of law the water right appurtenant to some 67
acres of land described in the 1903 deed was transferred
away by Lyman Skeen and never reconveyed. See Laws
of Utah, 1919, Chapter 67, Section 15 (now 73-1-11
U.C.A., 1953).
C. The court made no finding nor decree as to the
issue as to the relative priorities of the plaintiff's and defendants' water rights raised by the pleadings. See paragraph 5 of the complaint (R. 2) and paragraph 5 of the
answer (R. 14). The 1903 deed expressly states that the
Lyman Skeen right is, "subject to all prior rights ... "
(R. 4). The 1914 decree is silent on the subject. Again,
this is an uncertainty of vital importance to the litigants
and not resolved by the decree. This was error.
D. The Lyman Skeen right was made appurtenant
by contract to 110 acres of land within a tract of 147

22

acres specifically described. The defendants now claim,
and the trial court found, that the defendants were entitled to use this water on 80 acres, (of which ao are outside of the 147 acre tract) . There are only 50 acres on
which the water can legally be used. See area colored in
pink of the map, Exhibit C.
Laws of Utah, 1919 Chapter 67, Section 3 provides:
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and
the limit of all rights to the use of water in this
State." (Now Section 73-1-3)
The statutory provision quoted above modified
existing case law in the western states and is one of the
basic principles of the water law.
l \Viel on \Vater Rights Section 478

Hutchins Selected Problems of \Vater Law in
the \Vest pp. 3U-319.
"Beneficial use is not what is actually consumed,
but what is reasonably necessary for the purpose
to which the water is devoted, and an excessive
diversion of water for any purpose cannot be regarded as a diversion for beneficial use, in so far
as it is in excess of any reasonable requirement
for that purpose."

California P and A Co. t'. ftladero
Co. 167 Cal. 78, 138 P 718.

In Mt. Olivet C. Ass'n.

t•.

193, 235 P 876, the court said:

Canal~

Irr.

Salt Lake Cit,11, 65 Utah

"The extent of the rights of an appropriator is
limited to his reasonable necessities. The diver-
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sion and use of water creates a legal right only to
the quantity necessary for the use."
See also: Hardy v. Beaver County Irr. Co., 65
Utah 28, 234 P 524; Riordan v. Westwood, 115
Utah 215, 203 P2d 922; In re \Vater Rights of
Escalante 10 Utah 2d 77, 348 P2d 679.
In the case before this court the only expert evidence before the court was that the diversion by the defendants of 5 second feet for 48 hours every two weeks
for the first three months of the irrigation season reduced
to 4 second feet for the last three months of the season
would deliver to the 50 acres of land owned by the defendants, 102 acre feet annually more than the quantity
reasonably required. This results from the claim of the
defendant that he is entitled to divert for use of 50 acres
the water reasonably required for 110 acres as stated in
the 1903 deed. This claim is not supported by, but is contrary to the written contract of the parties, the evidence
and the basic law.
E. The question as to whether the defendants are
entitled to the benefit of water made available by the
pumping plant, storage and diversion dam, and .Echo
Reservoir water, all acquired and purchased since 1903
was in issue. See paragraph 5 of the complaint ( R. 2).
The 1903 deed restricted the Lyman Skeen right to
" ... water to be furnished from the now existing rights
of the Utah Light & Power Company in the waters of
Weber River, Mill Creek and Four Mile." ( R. 5). The
1914 decree limited the Lyman Skeen right to water
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"... in the natural sources of supply (exclusive of its
pwnping plant)."
Counsel for the defendants stipulated in open court
with respect to the source:
.MR. CLYDE: There is no issue on that. \Ve
don't deny that. I mean we are entitled to the four
and five ·feet exactly as the deed says, and purchases they have made from Echo or improvements they have made in their pumping system to
get other or different waters we have no interest.
\Vith all of the foregoing before the court, a findings and decree were made by the trial court without
mention of this important restriction of the contract
water right. This error defea ts the purpose of the litigation and deprives the plaintiff of its right to have all
material issues determined.
It is well settled that the failure of the trial court to
make findings of fact on all material issues is reversible
error where it is prejudicial. Piper v. Eakle, 78 Utah
342, 2 P2d 909; Pike v. Clar/..·, 95 Ctah 235, 75 P2d
1010; West v. Standard Fu.el Co., 81 Ctah 300, 17 P2d
292; Gaddis Im·. Co. v. illorrison, 3 Ctah 2d 43, 278
P2d 284; Simper v. Broten, 74 Ctah 178, 278 P 529.
CONCLCSIOX
The trial court refused to enforce the condition subsequent in the 1904 deed, which automatically terminated, because of the rcf usal of the plaintiff to deliver water
in H>6U and 1970, the exchange of water rights e\·idenced
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by the 1903 and 1904 deeds. The enforcement of the
termination of the exchange would make the other issues
tried entirely moot and would restore the parties to the
position they were in before the deeds were exchanged.
Assuming for the sake of argument only that the
exchange has not been terminated the trial court erred
in holding that the 1914 decree entirely superseded the
1903 deed, that the defendants can irrigate land other
than that described in the 1903 deed, and that all water
made available by the Lyman Skeen right can be beneficially used on the defendants' 50 acres of land that are
within the deed description. The court further erred in
failing to make findings and a decree on the issues of
priority, the obligation to pay expenses of operation and
maintenance in addition to the 30 cents per acre for the
water, and the restriction of the defendants' water source
to water rights in existence in 1903.
The decree should be reversed and the trial court
should be directed to make and enter a decree restoring
to the parties the water rights as they existed prior to the
exchange of deeds. If such relief is not granted, the
present decree should be modified to enforce the provisions of the 1903 deed as changed by the 1914 decree,
and to grant to the plaintiff the equitable relief mentioned above.
Respectfully Submitted,
SKEEN AND SKEEN
E. J. SKEEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDIX
THIS INDENTURE, made this 11th day of
February, 1903, between the C:T All LIGHT AND
POWER CO~lf PAXY, a corporation of the State of
Utah, of the first part, and LY1lf AN SKEEN of
Plain City, \Veber County, State of Utah, of the second
part, \VITNESSETH: That,
\VHEREAS, the party of the first part is the
owner of a canal and canal system that extends from
a certain point on the \Veber River, in and through the
Precincts of )larriott, Slaterville, Plain City, and
Warren, and have built and are operating said canal
system for irrigation of the lands of \Varren Precinct
and vicinity; and
\VHEREAS, said party of the second part agrees
to comply with certain requirements, and has executed
and delivered to the party of the first part a good and
sufficient deed to certain water ways and water rights;
NO\V, THEREFORE, the party of the first part,
in consideration of the sum of one dollar (.'f;J .UO) to it in
hand paid by the said party of the second part, the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and in consideration of the agreements hy the party of the second
part to and in fa,·or of the party of the first part hereinafter contained, does by these presents hereby promise
and agree, subject to the conditions hereinafter named,
to furnish and deliver to said party of the second part,
his heirs and assigns fore,·er, limited as hereinafter
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desi~~ted during the season of each and every year,

begmnmg April 15th, and ending October 15th except
~hen prevented by unusual storms, fioods, droughts,
disasters and other causes over which it has no control
and,
'
(I) Subject to all prior rights to the use of water
in the several streams and sources from which said party
of the first part now or may hereafter obtain its water
supply, a water right for said period for IIO acres of
land, which said water right, except as hereinafter
modified, is determined upon the basis of one cubic
foot per second, flowing continuously, for each one
hundred and fifty acres of land. The water to be furnished to said party of the second part is to be delivered
to him at from and on the grade of the nearest canal
owned by said party of the first part, and the said water
so delivered to said party of the second part must be
taken under the direction of the party of the first part,
and under such reasonable regulations as to place, and
kind of head gates to be placed in the canal, which are
to be furnished by the party of the first part, and also
as to time, turns, and periods the water is to be used,
consistent with the rights of the other water takers from
said system, and never to exceed the amount aforesaid
in the aggregate; and said water so furnished shall be
used by said party of the second part, his heirs and
assigns, upon the following described land, and not
otherwise, to-wit:

The east 1/2 of the northwest l)i of Section 31, in

Township Seven ( 7) north, of Range Two ( 2) West,
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Salt Lake Meridian U.S. Survey; also beginning at
the centre of said Section Thirty-one (31), thence
South 0 deg. 45 min. west 820 feet, to centre of creek
thence Southerly along creek to centre of road, thence
north 89 deg. 55 min. west along centre of road 2107.5
feet, thence north 1 deg. 30 min. west 1570 feet to north
line of said IJI Section, thence South 88 deg. 05 min.
east 1777.25 feet to place of beginning, in all 147.37
acres, more or less.
( 2) Said water to be furnished from the now existing rights of the Utah Light & Power Company in the

waters of Weber River, Mill Creek and Four Mile;

Provided, that when the water commences to fail,
or is low, or insufficient in said canal for any cause, or
in the sources from which the water is obtained by the
party of the first part, the grantee shall have his proportion and pro-rata of the water with others now and
hereafter, on the same system.
The said party of the second part, his heirs and
assigns, shall pay on or before the first day of November
in each year to said party of the first part, its successors
and assigns, the sum of Thirty Cents per acre, lawful
money of the United States, for each acre of water to
which he is entitled, but in no case shall he be entitled
to exceeding the amount of water hereby promised to
be furnished to said party of the second part. And in
case it shall be found at any time during or at the end
of the season that the party of the second part has used
or is using more water than he is entitled to, or has
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irrigated more acres of ground than called for in liis
deed, said party of the first part shall have the right
to collect the sum of $2.00 per acre for each additional
acre or part of an acre of water so used. And in default
of the payment of said sums of money by the party
of the second part to the party of the first part, or its
successors or assigns, for water used by the party of
the second part, or his heirs or assigns, on said lands
or any part of them, or otherwise, said claims for payment of water shall at all times be and constitute a first
lien in favor of the party of the first part on all of said
water and water rights hereby conveyed or intended to
be conveyed; and the party of the first part shall have
the power, and it shall be its right to sell said water
right or such part thereof as may be sufficient for the
payment of said claim or claims after giving to the
party of the second part thirty days' notice of the time,
terms and conditions of said sale, and said company,
the party of the first part, may be a purchaser at said
sale.
Provided, further, that the said party of the second
part shall have the right to redeem his water or water
right, so summarily sold within one year of the date
of said sale, and by paying the amount for which the
same was sold, together with the costs of said sale, and
interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said party of the
first part has hereunto caused its name and seal to be
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affixed by its President and Secretary this I I th day
of February, A.D. 1903.

UTAH LIGHT AXD PO\\'EH CO)lPANY,
By .Jos. F. Smith President
R. S. Campbell Secretary
(Duly acknowledged)

THIS IXDEXTCHE made the H>th day of
February, 1904, between Lyman Skeen and his wife
Anna Skeen, of Plain City, \\' eber County, Ctah, parties of the first part, and the l •tah Light & Railway
Company, a corporation of the State of t•tah, party
of the second part, \\' ITX ESSETll:
That whereas the parties of the first part have
been up to this date, and are now the owner of the water
right amounting to 307.~0-JO.j.6.95 of the whole of
Salt Creek, or Four :\Iile, a stream of water that takes
its rise south of Plain City, in the County of \Veber
and State of Ctah. and said parties of the first part
are the owner of other interest in water rights, including canals and water ditches. and.
\Vhereas the party of the second part is about to
make an exchange of said water rights from the said
Lyman Skeen and his wife Anna Skeen, and in exchange
therefor to transfer to them certain water rights in
the etah Light & Railway Company's canals and reserroirs, hereinafter ref erred to,X ow, therefore, the parties of the first part, in
consideration of the premises and the sum of one dollar
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to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, and also in consideration of a certain
deed for water and water rights given by the Utah
Light & Power Company, predecessor of the Utah
Light & Railway Company, in favor of said Lyman
Skeen, which said deed is dated the 11th day of February, 1903, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and transfer
to the party of the second part, its successors and
assigns forever all their right, of, in and to the water
and canal system of the said Salt Creek and Four Mile
streams, and all right of, in and to the Salt Creek irrigation, being 307.20 dollars, in what is known as Salt
Creek Irrigation Company, the said amount 307.201046.95 of the whole of said Salt Creek Irrigation
Company, an unincorporated association, together with
and including all the canals, ditches, reservoir and highwater rights owned by the parties; provided, that this
conveyance shall not be deemed to include the private
or lateral ditches owned by the parties of the first part
connected with the main canal, or otherwise.
Provided always, and the above grant, by the party
of the first part is made for the express consideration
that in case the Utah Light & Railway Company, or
its grantor, the Pioneer Electric Power Company, or
any of its or their assigns, or successors in interest, shall
wilfully refuse to carry out the agreement to deliver
water which is contained in the deed, to the party of the
first part hereto, which deed is dated in the caption 11th
of February, 1903, then the grant of the water right
in their deed shall cease and determine, and the parties
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hereto of the first part shall be restored to all the right
they had prior to the giving of this deed, and no length
of time shall vary their part of this agreement.
The party of the second part at its expense is to
take all necessary steps to protect and maintain the
water hereby conveyed from depletion or from being
taken from outside parties; and the grantor in case of
suit or suits at law to protect said right shall at his
expense furnish the witnesses and e,·idence to establish
and protect the right hereby conveyed.
Provided, the party of the first part may limit the
amount of water he shall use during any one season by
giving written notice to the Company of the amount
of water he desires to take, which notice shall be served
upon the Company not later than ~lay 1st of each year,
in the fault of such notice the grantee shall be deemed
to have taken his full amount to which he is entitled.

Witness
J.D. Skeen

Lyman Skeen
Anna Skeen

(Duly acknowledged)
(Title of the Court & Ca use)
STIPl:LATION
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between
the parties hereto that a judgment and decree shall be
entered in this cause by consent as follows:
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That in lieu of the delivery by the defendant to
~e plaintiff of water from its canal system as provided
m that certain deed from the plaintiff Lyman Skeen
and wife to the Ctah Light and Railway Company,
dated February 16th, 1904, and that certain deed from
the Utah Light and Power Company to Lyman Skeen
dated February 11th, 190:3, by turns and periods as in
said last mentioned deed contained, that beginning with
the irrigation season for the year 1915 and for each
and every year thereafter that the said defendant will
deliver to the plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, measured
at the headgate of that certain lateral upon the north
branch of defendant's canal system known as the Skeen
Ditch, every fourteen days, beginning with the irrigation season of each year, five second feet of water to be
used upon each delivery for a period of forty eight
hours during the months of April, .1\lay, and June, and
four second feet of water to be used for a period of
forty eight hours delivered every fourteen days as aforesaid in the months of July, August and September.
Provided that the said defendant shall not be held to
make delivery if unable to do so by reason of any un·
avoidable accident to its canal system during the period
required for its repair, or in case that there shall not
be a sufficient quantity at the natural sources of supply,
exclusive of its said pumping plant, of said canal system
to make delivery of the full amounts herein provided
for in which case it shall he required to deliver only
su~h quantity as it may be able to divert and deliver
from it said natural sources of supply.

34

It is further agreed that the said plaintiff shall

pay to the said defendant on or before the 1st day of
November of each year the sum of thirty three dollars
in full for the water supplied and furnished as aforesaid; provided however that the said defendant shall
not be required thereafter to make delivery as herein·
before provided until such payment shall have been
made with legal interest thereon.
It is further stipulated that each party shall pa,-

his own costs.

35

